(tentative last chapter)

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Although all the Texas recommendations were feasible, were, indeed, "sound and thorough", the could not be followed without making some kind of investigation. In the area of Agent Oswald, that was the last thing anybody federal wanted. Carr's proposals were not unusual. They presented no problems of cost, none of law. They were simple and obvious. The That they were so carefully avoided when they xxxxxtxx represent the very least any self-respecting investigation could undertake does not inspire confidence that Oswald was without this kind of history, that the federal government was without so embarrassing a complication.

The Commission did co "consider" them "seriously", for it has to live with them, once Carr put them in writing and while the Texas investigation was unburied. Exceedingly Ultimately it evolved a simple formula. It scraped the bottom of the Texas barrel, to appear to be compromising with the Texas suggestions, to be adopting them in part, the result being what the sup resed opinion of Jennary 27 describes as unacceptable to the country.

Hoovertware with the same day, Tay 14, 1964, which just happens to be two weeks before the Commission had hoped preceded, by on May 6, to complete its work. Hoover was accompanied by Edward Mark Alan M. Belmost, then an assistant director of the FEI. Next to Hoover was his long-time friend Clyde Tolson, with the title Essociate Director. Belmost was "in charge of all investigative work". Motone was accompanied by Richard M. Helms, then a Deputy Director, the men who ultimately succeeded McCone as Director.

There were no other CIA witnesses. Only a few of the agents who might have had contact with Oswald or who might have had knowledge of the contact of other agents with him were called as witnesses or provided africavits, as a substitute to testimony. Africavits not be neither examined nor cross-examined. In printing the testimony the Consission found it expedient to include the Hoover, LeCone, Belmont and Helms testimony is a single volume, its fifth, and to see to it that not of the other relevant testimony or evidence of any kind was included in the same volume.

Here is how that "investigation " went.

Some of the nature of the Commission staff actually seem to have thought that the Commission really was going to "inx investigate the reports of Oswald as an agent."

Although they have since preserved total silence, we those who had doubts during the Commission's life having stiffled them since, behind the scenes a number did attempt to get meaningful information, ask questions with import. This is reflected in letters drafted for Rankin's signature and staff discussions, none of which were expected to be seen by anyone during the Commission's active days. Over the years, a number of us working tog ther have resurrected them some of them from official oblivion.